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I
INTRODUCTION

It is plain enough that when we speak either in the United States or in
Australia of the injunction as an equitable remedy, we do so by reference to the
remedy developed in the English High Court of Chancery. But the existence of
common origins should not distract attention from the impact upon equitable
remedies of the very different systems of government in Britain, the United
States, and Australia.
The operation of a federal system of government in the United States and
Australia, with the concomitant doctrine of judicial review, has given the
injunctive remedy a scope undreamt of by its English creators. Differences
between the two federal systems mean that the injunction has some uses in each
system it does not have in the other. But, that having been said, what is
remarkable is the broad similarity in developments over the last thirty years in
the United States and Australia in the "principles" attending the administration
of the injunctive remedy in private law. This article shall refer to such matters
as the standards for an interlocutory injunction, the adequacy of legal remedies
(with the "irreparable injury" rule), and the need for a legal or statutory right
of a proprietary nature. In broad terms, the result of these developments is that
the injunction is fast losing its character as an extraordinary remedy.
The injunction has been frequently described as a remedy that is discretionary and extraordinary. The former reflects the notion that equitable remedies
are designed to meet the needs of the particular case after a close analysis of the
facts, and that equitable remedies accommodate the relative merits of plaintiff
and defendant in the particular case by, for example, the imposition upon the
plaintiff of terms as the price for relief. On the other hand, the description of
the injunction as an extraordinary remedy expresses the concern of legal
formalism or positivism with judicial discretion. This is an old and continuing
conflict. In the terms recently used by Justice Scalia, writing extrajudicially,
equity in administering the injunctive remedy is concerned not so much with
establishing or applying general rules of law as with a "discretion conferring
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approach." 1 The wide use of the injunction also cuts across the importance
traditionally attached to the role of the jury verdict as the paradigm factfinding
process, even where there is no constitutional imperative. And, it must not be
forgotten that, at least in the Australian experience, the greater the scope
allowed judicial discretion at trial, the narrower the avenues of appeal.
It is also important to bear in mind that the fewer rigorous courses in
equitable remedies that are available in the law schools, the greater the tendency
of the practitioners they produce to engage in the ritualistic repetition of verbal
formulae (such as the so-called "irreparable injury rule"). There is also a
correlative lack of the necessary confidence (and scholarship), where required,
to strip equity back to its basics and reformulate particular doctrines. In a
cognate field, the development of the remedial constructive trust has been
bedevilled by uncritical repetition of phrases from judgments of Justice Cardozo,
a subject that Professor Powell discusses in his article.2
As I have indicated, the influence of constitutional law upon the modem
development of the injunction in federal systems should not be overlooked.
Statutes or executive acts that lack the necessary constitutional support may have
a serious impact upon the affairs of citizens even though no property rights are
invaded. Yet the injunction is clearly an appropriate remedy. Such considerations have contributed to the loosening, in private law, of the requirements
curbing the availability of the injunction. Thus, this article turns first to
constitutional law.
II
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

The federal system of government established by the Australian Constitution
is, to a degree, an adaptation of that of the United States. In particular, the
judicial power provided for in Chapter III of the Constitution is separated from
that of the executive and legislature, and the doctrine of judicial review is
entrenched. There are no "legislative courts" (in the United States sense of that
term) created by the Parliament outside the provisions of Chapter III. Taxation
and bankruptcy matters are adjudicated in the Federal Court of Australia. But
military matters do stand in a special position in Australia, as in the United
3
States.
The provisions in the Australian Constitution (sections 75 and 76) specifying
the original jurisdiction of the High Court of Australia were drawn from Article
III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the United States Constitution. But Article III
contained no express provision for injunctive relief against federal officers.

1. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHi. L. REv. 1175, 1177 (1989).
2. H. Jefferson Powell, "Cardozo's Foot": The Chancellor's Conscience and Constructive Trusts,
56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7 (Summer 1993).
3. Re Tracey; ex parte Ryan, (1989) 166 C.L.R. 518, 527, in which the High Court referred to
Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
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Accordingly, a provision was added to the Australian Constitution, as section
75(v), to provide for "matters" in which "a writ of Mandamus or prohibition or
an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth.. . ."

Thus,

Australia has a constitutionally entrenched federal jurisdiction in public law to
use the injunction against officers of the federal government who act or threaten
to act, not only pursuant to an invalid law, but also beyond the authority given
them by a valid law, in denial of natural justice, or otherwise in error of law.
Federal officers have never enjoyed any sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth.
4
Further, in Australia, there is no equivalent of the Anti-Injunction Act.
Thus, Parliament has not directed the federal courts to refuse any injunction to
stay proceedings in a state court. Nor is there any judge-made doctrine of
federal abstention, whereby, even though all requirements for jurisdiction and
justiciability are satisfied, a court exercising the federal judicial power may not
decide some matters before it. The Federal Court of Australia has issued orders
against the plaintiff in a proceeding in a state court, where that proceeding was
beyond the constitutional competence of the state court or encroached upon the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Federal Court.5 Such orders have an affinity with
the common injunction by which Chancery restrained proceedings in other
courts.
The constitutional arrangements in Australia are markedly different in a
number of other respects significant in the development of the law of injunctions.
First, there is no constitutional guarantee, either at the state or federal level, of
trial by jury in civil cases. It is highly unusual for a jury to be used in any civil
case arising out of a commercial dispute. Australia has no body of decisions
corresponding to that in the United States interpreting the Seventh Amendment.
Nor are there, either at the state or federal level, constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech or due process. This is of some significance in the development of the ex parte injunction, or temporary restraining order. Australian
courts need not wrestle with the constitutional implications of decisions6
concerning wrongs capable of repetition yet evading review, which, although
moot because the injury is of limited duration and has ceased before the
completion of federal litigation, are treated as justiciable.
The High Court of Australia has exercised with comparative frequency its
authority to hold invalid federal legislation that exceeds the powers of the

4.

28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1978), discussed in ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 11.2

(1989).
5. St. Justins Properties Pty. Ltd. v. Rule Holdings Pty. Ltd., (1980) 40 F.L.R. 282; Denpro Pty.
Ltd. v. Centrepoint Freeholds Pty. Ltd., (1983) 48 A.L.R. 39; Lural Ins. Servs. Pty. Ltd. v. Kairi Pty. Ltd.,
(1985) Australian Trade Prac. Rep. (CCH) 40-553. See also Grace Bros. Pty. Ltd. v. Magistrates of the
Local Courts of New South Wales, (1988) 84 A.L.R. 492, 497, affd, (1989) 23 F.C.R. 68.
6. See, e.g., Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968). However,
it may be observed that that case involved an ex parte order with effect for no fewer than ten days. In
Australia, and therefore quite apart from any constitutional question, I think this would ordinarily be
regarded as a miscarriage of judicial discretion. See, CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, § 2.5.3.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 56: No. 3

national legislature. The interstate commerce power has never been given the
sweep allowed by the Supreme Court of the United States since the aftermath
of the New Deal, and other heads of federal power dealing with corporations and
family law (which have no counterpart in the powers of the Congress) have, on
some occasions, been read rather narrowly. Thus, in the last ten years,
provisions of federal laws have been struck down in at least seven cases.7 This
active use of the doctrine of judicial review gives added scope to the injunctive
remedy.
On the other hand, the limited nature of the guarantees found in the
Constitution has meant that, in Australia, the occasion has not arisen for the
development of the institutional decree, whereby a federal court undertakes the
reform of the structure of governmental institutions. Unlike the U.S. courts, the
Australian courts have not been called upon to mould decrees having a
significant impact upon third parties, such as decrees modifying the conditions
of confinement in a prison or mental hospital, changing the manner of voting for
public officers, or requiring the levy by a state of an increased property tax to
fund the changes in a school system required by the desegregation orders of a
federal court. Therefore, there has not been any discussion comparable to that
in the United States of the significance for the judicial function of the differences
between conventional adjudication of private rights and the new model of
institutional remedial litigation.' On the other hand, even in private litigation
in Australia, an equity court will take into account the impact of a proposed
injunction upon innocent third parties and the public generally.9
The position in England stands in marked contrast to those in Australia and
the United States. In English public law, the injunction is used to restrain ultra
vires or other legally improper conduct of public officers, but, given the absence
both of any institutionalised separation of powers and of any doctrine of judicial
review of the constitutionality of parliamentary or executive action, the
injunction has had no role to play in constitutional law, as we understand it. The

English situation has changed only recently and in recognition of the binding
force of European Community law given by section 2 of the European
Communities Act 1972 (U.K.).

In Factortame Ltd. v. Secretary of State for

7. The decisions are Cormick v. Cormick, (1984) 156 C.L.R. 170 (family law); Actors and
Announcers Equity Ass'n of Australia v. Fontana Films Pty. Ltd., (1982) 150 C.L.R. 169 (corporations);
Queensland Electricity Comm'n v. The Commonwealth, (1985) 159 C.L.R. 192 (State functions); Re F,
ex parte F, (1986) 161 C.L.R. 376 (family law); Davis v. The Commonwealth, (1988) 166 C.L.R. 79 (trade
marks); The Incorporation Case, (1990) 169 C.L.R. 482 (corporations); Mutual Pools & Staff Pty. Ltd.
v. Commissioner of Taxation, (1992) 66 A.L.J.R. 223 (sales tax).
8. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,89 HARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976); Frank M. Coffin, The Frontierof Remedies, 67 CAL. L. REV. 983 (1979); Robert E. Easton, The
Dual Role of the Structural Injunction, 99 YALE L.J. 1983 (1990).

The question of State taxes was

considered in Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990). This case points to the fundamental issue of
whether this use of the injunctive remedy may so depart from traditional concepts as to go beyond the
constitutional limits of the judicial power.
9. Silktone Pty. Ltd. v. Devreal Capital Pty. Ltd., (1990) 21 N.S.W.L.R. 317, 324.
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Transport (No. 2),"' the House of Lords held that the applicants for an
interlocutory injunction had a strong case to present to the Court of Justice of
the European Communities that British legislation empowering a Minister to
make regulations to provide for the registration of British fishing vessels
contravened the provisions of the European Treaty by depriving the applicants
(who represented Spanish fishing interests) of their Community-law rights. The
result was the grant of an interlocutory injunction restraining the Minister from
implementing the British law, pending the decision of the European Court. It
is perhaps unfortunate that, having regard to the long experience in comparable
situations of the federal courts in other English-speaking countries, the House
of Lords was content to strike out for itself without any regard for wisdom that
might be found elsewhere.

In Australia, the early decisions as to when to grant an interlocutory
injunction in aid of a claim of alleged invalidity of a federal statute paid close
regard to the experience of the United States."1 More recently, Sir Anthony
Mason, the present Chief Justice of Australia, said that the principles governing
the grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions in private law litigation are to be
applied in public-law cases, including constitutional cases, notwithstanding that
different factors arise for consideration.12 His Honour referred to the Canadian
decision Morgentaler v. Ackroyd, 3 where it was suggested that an interim

injunction would lie, but only to prevent "grave injustice."14 Of this, Sir
Anthony Mason said that it, perhaps, stated the position too strongly against a
plaintiff who sought an interlocutory injunction in Australia. His Honour
continued:
In arriving at a balance of convenience the Court will take into account the
seriousness of the conduct enjoined by the statute and the damage to the public
interest that may be caused by restraining its enforcement. And in some cases
the balance of convenience may be affected by the Court's perception or
evaluation of the strength of the plaintiffs case for invalidity . . . . In the
absence of compelling grounds, it is the duty of the Court to respect, indeed, to

10. [1991] 1 A.C. 603. The decision is discussed by Professor Sir William Wade in two Notes, What
Has Happened to the Sovereignty of Parliament?, 107 LAW Q. REv. 1 (1991); Injunctive Relief Against
the Crown and Ministers, 107 LAW. Q. REv. 4 (1991). The European Court has since held that the
British statutory system was contrary to Community law, as discriminating against nationals of other
member states: R. v. Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd., [1991] 3 All E.R. 769.
See also R. v. Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Equal Opportunities Comm'n, [1992] 1 All
E.R. 545, 561; Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council v. Wickes Building Supplies, Ltd., [1992] 3 All
E.R. 717 (HL).
11. See, e.g., The King v. Macfarlane, ex parte O'Flanagan and O'Kelly, (1923) 32 C.L.R. 518, 529,
539, 573, where reference was made to such decisions as Cruickshank v. Bidwell, 176 U.S. 73, 80-81
(1900), and Boise Artesian Hot and Cold Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U.S. 276, 282-83 (1909).
12. Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd. v. South Australia, (1986) 161 C.L.R. 148, 153, construed in
Richardson v. Forestry Comm'n, (1987) 164 C.L.R. 261; and Polyukhovich v. The Commonwealth, (1990)
64 A.L.J.R. 589.
13. (1983) 42 O.R.2d 659, 668.
14. Cf. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 85 S.Ct. 1 (1964) (refusing to enjoin enforcement
of 1964 Civil Rights Act pending final determination of constitutionality of Act). For reasons that are
unclear, this case is not reported in the official United States Reports.

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 56: No. 3

defer to, the enactment of the legislature until that enactment is adjudged ultra
vires. 5

III
INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS
In Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd. v. South Australia, one of the stated requirements a plaintiff seeking an interlocutory injunction must satisfy was said to be
that the plaintiff would suffer "irreparable injury for which damages will not be
an adequate compensation unless an injunction is granted."1 6 In other
Australian authorities, reference is from time to time made to the phrase
"irreparable injury" in dealing with interlocutory injunction applications.1 7
Speaking of the position in the United States, Professor Laycock has stated that
whilst irreparable injury figures prominently in various formulations of the test
for preliminary relief, the term is not used in relation to final relief.18 That is
true also of the Australian authorities. There, the phrase "irreparable injury,"
when used in relation to applications for interlocutory relief, is understood in the
sense explained long ago by Baron Alderson in Attorney-General v. Hallett. "I
take the meaning of irreparable injury to be that which, if not prevented by
injunction, cannot be afterwards compensated by any decree which the Court can
pronounce in the result of a cause."19 The considerations involved tend, in
practice, to merge into those with which the court is concerned in dealing with
the balance of convenience.
These points are illustrated by the decision of Chief Justice Mason in
Richardson v. Forestry Commission.2" The plaintiff, as a federal minister,
sought an interlocutory injunction restraining the defendants from carrying on
forestry activities in an area in Tasmania, allegedly in contravention of a federal
law that sought to give effect to Australia's obligations under the Convention for
the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. The defendants
asserted that the law was invalid. The law provided for a Commission of Inquiry
to determine whether the area in question qualified as a "world heritage
area."'" The Chief Justice held that there was a real, as distinct from a bare,
possibility that the area did so qualify and that the activities of the defendants
might adversely affect its values as a world heritage area. He said that
[diespite statements that the plaintiff must show that it is probable that the
plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if no injunction is granted, in a case such
as the present it is enough for the plaintiff to show that irreparable injury is a

15.
16.
17.
19.

Castlemaine, 161 C.L.R. at 155-56.
Id. at 153. The phrase "temporary restraining order" is not used in Australia.
See, e.g., infra note 20 and accompanying text.
DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 113 (1991).
(1847) 153 Eng. Rep. 1316, 1321.

20.
21.

(1987) 164 C.L.R. 261.
Id. at 264-65.

18.
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possibility in the sense stated. The object of the Act being to preserve intact
that which may be a unique heritage, the possibility of injury is enough to sustain
an interlocutory injunction by way of protecting the area in question, thereby
preserving the subject-matter of the inquiry pending its completion at least.n

As a general proposition, in order to secure an interlocutory injunction, the
plaintiff must show (1) that there is a serious question to be tried and (2) that
the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction. The operation
of these precepts in practice is best illustrated by a consideration of the following
passage from the judgment of Justice McLelland in Kolback Securities Ltd. v.
Epoch Mining NL:2
Where a plaintiff's entitlement to ultimate relief is uncertain, the Court, in
deciding to grant or refuse an interlocutory injunction, must consider what
course is best calculated to achieve justice between the parties in the circumstances of the particular case, pending the resolution of the uncertainty, bearing
in mind the consequences to the defendant of the grant of an injunction in
support of relief to which the plaintiff may ultimately be held not to be entitled,
and the consequences to the plaintiff of the refusal of an injunction in support
of relief to which the plaintiff may ultimately be held to be entitled.. . . Where
the uncertainty depends in whole or in part on a contested question of fact it is
not appropriate for the Court to decide that question on the interlocutory
application. Where the uncertainty depends in whole or in part on a contested
question of law, it may or may not be appropriate for the Court to decide that
question on the interlocutory application, depending on the circumstances, e.g,
whether the question is novel or difficult, or is susceptible of resolution on the
present state of the evidence, or whether the urgency of the matter renders it
impracticable to give proper consideration to the question ....
If the Court
does decide the question of law the uncertainty is to that extent removed.
Unless the plaintiff shows that there is at least a serious question to be tried
which if resolved in its favour would entitle it to final relief then the requirements of justice as between the parties will dictate that an interlocutory
injunction should be refused....
Apart from this, although normally the Court "does not undertake a
preliminary trial, and give or withhold interlocutory relief upon a forecast as to
the ultimate result of the case,". . . there are some kinds of case in which for the
purpose of seeing where lies the balance of convenience (or more specifically
"the balance of the risk of doing an injustice".. .), it is desirable for the Court
to evaluate the strength of the plaintiff's case for final relief ....
One class of
case to which this applies is where the decision to grant or refuse an interlocutory injunction will in a practical sense determine the substance of the matter in
issue."

The point made by Justice McLelland in the last paragraph reflects the
particular concerns that arise where, for all practical purposes, the provisional
remedy brings the controversy to an end; a similar approach has been taken in
the United States.'
As will be apparent from the remarks of Justice
22. Id. at 275 (citing Clements and Marshall Pty. Ltd. v. Field Peas Mktg. Bd. (Tas.), (1947) 76
C.L.R. 401, 407).
23. (1987) 8 N.S.W.L.R. 533, 535-36.
24. Id. (citations omitted).
25. See, e.g., Triebwasser & Katz v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 535 F.2d 1356, 1360 (2d Cir. 1976).
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McLelland, in other respects the position in Australia resembles that advocated
by Professor Leubsdorf2 and Judge Posner27 (the latter with use of an
algebraic formula).
In Australia, the Rules of Court of the Federal Court and of the state courts
do not spell-out criteria for the grant of preliminary injunctions, such as those
found in the United States in Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In Australia, it is a judge-made requirement that the plaintiff be obliged to give
to the court what in practice is identified as "the usual undertaking as to
damages." In the Federal Court, this is understood as an undertaking to pay to
any party adversely affected by the interlocutory injunction such compensation
(if any) as the Federal Court thinks just, in such manner as the court directs. It
is a matter for the practice of each court to decide whether the undertaking
required extends beyond parties to the litigation to third parties. 2 In the
absence of an undertaking, a defendant who has been enjoined but is ultimately
victorious at the trial has no recourse to recover the loss suffered in complying
with the interlocutory injunction.29
In general, the administration of the important remedy of interlocutory
injunction is left to the practice as developed by the judges. Thus, in a given
case, the court may require that the undertaking be secured. An injunction will
be granted ex parte only for a short time, usually no more than one or two days.
It is then for the plaintiff to seek continuation of the injunction, as an interlocutory injunction, but with notice having been given to the defendant. The
effective operation of the system depends on the existence of a relatively small
number of barristers with experience of this type of work. An applicant for an
ex parte interim injunction has a duty to disclose to the court all relevant
matters, including matters that would have been raised by the other side if the

defendant had been present; failure to observe that duty necessitates the
discharge of an injunction granted on the application, though a fresh application
may be made.'

26. John Leubsdorf, The Standardsfor Preliminary Injunction, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525, 542 (1978).
27. American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Hospital Prods. Ltd., 780 F.2d 589, 593-94 (7th Cir. 1986).
28. Smith Kline & French Labs. (Australia) Ltd. v. Secretary, Dept. of Community Servs. and
Health, (1989) 89 A.L.R. 366. The appropriate measure of damages is that flowing from the grant of
the interlocutory injunction; this must be distinguished from the damages flowing from the litigation--damages not reasonably foreseeable from circumstances known to the plaintiff at the time the
interlocutory injunction was obtained will seldom be awarded. Air Express Ltd. v. Ansett Transp. Indus.
(Operations) Pty. Ltd., (1979-81) 146 C.L.R. 249.
29. National Australia Bank Ltd. v. Bond Brewing Holdings Ltd., [1991] 1 V.R. 386. In England,
the settled practice has been not to require an undertaking as to damages from the Crown where the
Crown seeks to enforce a public law, rather than to protect or enforce its proprietary or contractual
rights. F. Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. A.G. v. Secretary of State for Trade and Indus., [1975] A.C. 295;
Kirklees Borough Council v. Wickes Building Supplies Ltd., [1991] 4 All E.R. 240. In Australia, an
undertaking will be required from the federal government, at least where it seeks an injunction to protect
a proprietary rather than a purely governmental right. Commonwealth v. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd.,
(1980) 147 C.L.R. 39, 59 (Mason, J.).
30. Town & Country Sport Resorts (Holdings) Pty. Ltd. v. Partnership Pac. Ltd., (1988) 20 F.C.R.
540.
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In this as in other areas, there is a tendency to seek comfort in a complex of
rules and sub-rules. An example concerns the strength of the case to be shown
by an applicant for an interlocutory injunction which is mandatory, rather than
prohibitory, in nature. In Shepherd Homes Ltd v. Sandham, Justice Megarry said
the following:
[O]n motion, as contrasted with the trial, the court is far more reluctant to grant
a mandatory injunction than it would be to grant a comparable prohibitory
injunction. In a normal case the court must, inter alia, feel a high degree of
assurance that at the trial it will appear that the injunction was rightly granted;
and this is a higher standard than is required for a prohibitory injunction.3

In a number of Australian decisions, this passage was then described as revealing
a "principle" as to the need for a "high degree of assurance in granting
32
temporary restraining orders which were mandatory rather than prohibitory.
However, the exploration by Professor Leubsdorf, in his important article,33 of
the development in the last century of the interim injunction showed that the
English judicial masters of equity at that time would have eschewed any such
rigid formulation. The existence of the alleged principle has now been
discounted in the Australian decisions.'
IV
ADEQUACY OF LEGAL REMEDIES

As is well recognised, where the injunction is sought in aid of purely

equitable rights, such as those flowing from a trust or other fiduciary relationship, the question of adequacy of possible legal remedies does not arise. 35 Thus,

it has never been sufficient for a trustee to answer a claim by a beneficiary for
an injunction to restrain a breach of trust by allowing that the beneficiary be left
to a pecuniary remedy and the breach be allowed to continue. The trust creates

equitable, not legal, rights. On the other hand, where the injunction is sought
in aid of a legal right, the traditional view has been quite different. In that view,
it must be shown, inter alia, that the legal remedy is inadequate. The require-

31. (1971) Ch. 340, 351.
32. For example, Queensland v. Australian Telecommunications Comm'n, (1985) 59 A.L.J.R. 562,
563; Tsimidopoulos v. Mulson Holdings Pty. Ltd., [1989] 1 W.A.R. 359.
33. Leubsdorf, supra note 26, at 525. See also the judgment of Chief Judge Re in United States
v. Price, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982), where the point is made that the fact that expenditure of money
may be required to comply with an interlocutory mandatory injunction is not necessarily an answer to
the making of such an order.
34. See, e.g., Aerospatiale Societe Nationale Industrielle v. Aerospatiale Helicopters Pty. Ltd., (1986)
11 F.C.R. 37; Businessworld Computers Pty. Ltd. v. Australian Telecommunications Comm'n, (1988) 82
A.L.R. 499, 503-04. For English treatment, see Films Rover Int'l Ltd. v. Cannon Film Sales Ltd., [1986]
3 All E.R. 772.
35. Heavener v. Loomes, (1924) 34 C.L.R. 306, 326.
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ways and has been much discussed in recent
ment has been expressed in various
36
literature in the United States.
The requirement was formulated in the eighteenth century when, looking
back to the English constitutional struggles of the preceding century and forward
to the rise of legal positivism in the next, the Court of Chancery needed to
of arbitrary and unprincipled interference
support its decisions against allegations
37

in common law proceeding.
In Heavener v. Loomes, two distinguished Australian judges described the
position earlier established in England and later carried to Australia as follows:
The foundation of the doctrine of "irreparable damage" is the principle settled
by the House of Lords as early as 1773 in Welby v. Duke of Rutland, (1773) 2
Bro. Parl. Cas. 39. The House accepted the argument of the respondent that,
where the title sued upon is purely legal, some equity must be shown to justify
the intervention of the Court, such as "an injustice irremediable by a Court of
law." That is, that the ancillary jurisdiction of the Court could not be invoked
in the absence of some special circumstance creating an equity.'

James Kent, of the New York Court of Chancery and Justice Joseph Story of the
U.S. Supreme Court, who may be taken as the founders of equity jurisprudence39
in the United States, were, of course, fully apprised of English developments.
Hence, the statement by the United States Supreme Court in 1830, in Boyce's
Executors v. Grundy: "It is not enough that there is a remedy at law; it must be
plain and adequate, or, in other words, as practical and as efficient to the ends
of justice and its prompted administration, as the remedy in equity. '
Various reasons could explain why, in a given case, the legal remedy was not
as practical and efficient as that in equity. Boyce's Executors v. Grundy, itself,
provides an example. It was clear that, in cases of fraud, courts of common law
and courts of equity had concurrent jurisdiction. A fraudulent misrepresentation
would vitiate the contract. Money paid under it might be recovered, and the
fraud could be pleaded in defence to any action brought at law upon the
contract. But equity had the means that the common law lacked to ascertain and
provide for the adjustments necessary between the parties in cases where a
simple handing back of property or repayment of money would not put them in
as good a position as before they entered their transaction. Because it thus saw
36.

Douglas Laycock, Injunctions and the IrreparableInjury Rule, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1065 (1979)

[hereinafter Injunctions] (reviewing OWEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978)); Douglas

Laycock, The Death of the IrreparableInjury Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV.687 (1990); Peter Linzer, On the
Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 CoLUM. L. REV.
111 (1981); Doug Rendleman, The InadequateRemedy at Law Prerequisitefor an Injunction, 33 U. FLA.
L. REV. 346 (1981); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance,89 YALE L.J.271 (1979); Edward
Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1982).
37. See DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY BRITAIN 71-87, 159-75 (1989).
38. (1925) 34 C.L.R. 306, 325 (Isaacs and Rich, JJ.) (citations omitted).
39. See Peter C. Hoffer, PrincipledDiscretion: Concealment, Conscience, and Chancellors,3 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 53, 61-63 (1991).
40. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 210, 215 (1830).
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the possibility of restitio in integrum and was able to concede the right of the
defrauded party to rescind in a much wider variety of cases than those with
which the common law would rescind, the equitable remedy was more practical
and efficient to the ends of justice.41
Another, and more recent, example of the procedural inadequacies at law
that cannot meet the needs of the situation in hand, is provided by Doulton
Potteries Ltd. v. Bronotte.42 The plaintiff owned a machine of unique design,
which was used by it in the manufacture of certain pipes. It sent the die for
repair by the defendant, but no price had been fixed between the parties. The
defendant later demanded as payment a sum in excess of what the plaintiff
regarded as the fair cost of the repairs. The defendant asserted a lien for the
sum he claimed. The machine had a special value to the plaintiff because a
replacement would take four months to manufacture and the defendant was the
only person who could manufacture it. There was then no procedure at law in
the New South Wales Supreme Court whereby, if a defendant relied upon a lien,
the court might order the property to be given up to the plaintiff, provided he
paid into court, to abide by the event of the action, the sum claimed in respect
of the lien. It was held that, in those circumstances, the plaintiff was justified in
seeking equitable relief, and that the jurisdiction in equity was not limited to
cases where the chattel concerned had a peculiar or sentimental value. A
declaration was made as to the sum that was a reasonable price for the relevant
repairs and, upon an undertaking by the plaintiff to pay that sum, an injunction
was granted restraining the defendant from preventing the plaintiff from
retrieving the machine in question.
The legal remedy may be inadequate, not for any intrinsic reason, but
because of the financial circumstances of the defendant. Thus an injunction may
be granted to restrain breach of a pre-receivership contract because a limited
chance of recovering upon any verdict for damages exists; this relief has been
decreed even though the general body of creditors may thereby be disadvantaged.43
Another example of the inadequacy of legal remedies giving rise to an equity
is the commission of repeated activities in respect of which the plaintiff would
otherwise have to pursue consecutive actions at law." A defendant who evinces
an intent not to observe a covenant to pay an annuity to the plaintiff may be
required by injunction to observe the covenant, under the sanction of punishment
for contempt, rather than leave the plaintiff to resort to an action in debt each
year.45 Still, the most frequently encountered special circumstance creating an
41. Alati v. Kruger, (1955) 94 C.L.R. 216, 223-24.
42. [1971] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 591.
43. Schering Pty. Ltd. v. Forrest Pharmaceutical Co. Pty. Ltd., [1982] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 286; Re Diesels
& Components Pty. Ltd., (1985) 9 A.C.L.R. 825, 827-28; see also Swiss Bank Corp. v. Lloyds Bank Ltd.,
[1979] Ch. 548,566-67; H.C. Horack, Insolvency and Specific Performance,31 HARV. L. REv. 702 (1918).
44. Angelides v. James Stedman Henderson's Sweets Ltd., (1927) 40 C.L.R. 43, 65-66.
45. Beswick v. Beswick, [1968] A.C. 58, 81, 97-98. For another example, see Developments in the
Law: Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REv. 994, 1001 (1965). Another example is provided by the cases where
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equity for an injunction in aid of a legal right, is the inadequacy of the
compensation provided by damages at law.
In his article Injunctions and the IrreparableInjury Rule, Professor Laycock
says of the irreparable injury rule:
In the first place, the [irreparable injury] rule has two formulations, and this
occasionally causes a judge to think there are two requirements; that there be no
adequate remedy at law and that the injury be irreparable. This misunderstanding in turn leads to the suggestion that the injury itself must have some special
quality-perhaps that it be especially egregious-when "irreparable injury"
should mean simply injury that cannot be repaired (remedied) at law. Thus,
even relatively insignificant injury is irreparable if it cannot be measured in
money.'

The law, as developed in the Australian authorities over a long period, has
avoided the misunderstanding referred to by the learned author, and has been
expressed in terms consistent with those advocated by him. Thus, the High
Court of Australia said, in 1923, that damage would be irreparable in the
necessary sense if "pecuniary compensation would be inadequate protection" of
the plaintiff's legal right.47 Earlier, in the Supreme Court of New South Wales,
Sir Phillip Street, the Chief Judge in Equity, had said that, in this context, the
word "irreparable" has a special meaning, different from the sense in which it is
ordinarily used out of court. Street continued:
What is meant by the term, as I understand it, is simply an injury of so serious
a character that damages would not be an adequate compensation, and that on
this ground the party should not be compelled to submit to it even for a short
period and to take his compensation in the shape of damages.'

Contemporary English authority was to like effect.4 9
In the Australian decisions over the last twenty-five years, matters have gone
further in favour of extending the availability of the injunction. The point is
illustrated by reference to the recent acceptance of the proposition that the court
should not ask whether damages would provide the plaintiff with an adequate
remedy, but rather whether, in all the circumstances, it is just that the plaintiff
The beginning of this
should be confined to his remedy in damages.5 0
development may be found in the judgment of Justice Windeyer in the High
Court of Australia, in Coulls v. Bagot's Executor and Trustee Company
Limited.5 ' His Honour addressed the question of whether specific relief was

repeated trespass to land is enjoined. See, e.g., Whittaker v. Stangvick, 111 N.W. 295, 297 (Minn. 1907).
46. Laycock, Injunctions, supra note 36, at 1070.
47. The King v. Macfarlane, Ex parte O'Flanagan and O'Kelly, (1923) 32 C.L.R. 518, 550.
48. McCarty v. The Council of the Municipality of North Sydney, (1918) 18 S.R. (N.S.W.) 210,215.
49. Litchfield-Speer v. Queen Anne's Gate Syndicate (No. 2), Ltd., [1919] 1 Ch. 407, 411.
50. State Transport Authority v. Apex Quarries Ltd., [1988] V.R. 187, 193; City of Melbourne v.
Hamas Pty Ltd., (1987) 62 L.G.R.A. 250, 261-262.
51. (1967) 119 C.L.R. 460, 503.
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available to a plaintiff to enforce a contract to pay money or transfer property
to a third person who was not a party to the contract and who could not sue on
it. Justice Windeyer said:
It seems to me that contracts to pay money or transfer property to a third
person are always, or at all events very often, contracts for breach of which
damages would be an inadequate remedy-all the more so if it be right (I do not
think it is) that damages recoverable by the promisee are only nominal.
Nominal or substantial, the question seems to be the same, for when specific
relief is given in lieu of damages it is because the remedy, damages, cannot
satisfy the demands of justice.
"The Court" said Lord Selborne, "gives specific performance instead of damages
only when it can by that means do more perfect and complete justice." 2 Lord
Erskine said of the doctrine of specific performance:
This court assumed the jurisdiction upon this single principle; that the party
had a legal right to the performance of the contract; to which right the
courts of law, whose jurisdiction did not extend beyond damages, had not
the means of giving effect. 3
Complete and perfect justice to a promisee may well require that a promisor
perform his promise to pay money or transfer property to a third party. I see
no reason why specific performance should not be had in such cases-but of
course not where the promise was to render some personal service. There is no
reason today for limiting by particular categories, rather than by general
principle, the cases in which orders for specific performance will be made. The
days are long past when the common law courts looked with jealousy upon what
they thought was a usurpation by the Chancery Court of their jurisdiction.'

The English Court of Appeal then spoke in similar terms in Evans Marshall &
Co. Ltd v. Bertola S.A. 55 In the Supreme Court of Victoria, in Belgrave
Nominees Pty. Ltd. v. Barlin-Scott Airconditioning (Aust.) Pty. Ltd.,56 the
plaintiff obtained a mandatory injunction compelling the defendant, a subcontractor for the renovation of buildings owned by the plaintiffs, to deliver up a
certain air conditioning plant that had been affixed to the premises and that had
been wrongly removed by the defendant. The Victorian Supreme Court had
particular regard to the pecuniary circumstances of the plaintiffs and to the
closeness to completion of the renovations; it concluded that, in all the
circumstances, it would not be just to confine the plaintiffs to their remedy in
damages for detention, conversion, and trespass. 7
The result of these developments is that little is now heard in Australian
courts of any "rule" as to the need for "irreparable injury." In addition,
although the injunction is, as I have indicated, a remedy in Australian
constitutional law, its use there has not been attended with the controversy
sometimes apparent in the United States, particularly in civil rights litigation.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Wilson v. Northampton and Banbury Junction Ry. Co., (1874) 9 Ch. App. 279, 284.
Alley v. Deschamps, (1806) 33 Eng. Rep. 278, 279.
(1967) 119 C.L.R. at 503.
(1973) 1 W.L.R. 349, 379-80.
(1984) V.R. 947.
Id. at 955.
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There has not been any call to lessen the role of the injunction in constitutional
law by reviving and strengthening an "irreparable injury" rule.
Nevertheless, from time to time, cases do arise in private law where a
plaintiff fails to obtain specific relief, not because of any element of personal
service or other special relationship between the parties, or because of alleged
difficulty of the supervision of any mandatory orders, but on the footing that
damages will provide an adequate recompense. I shall discuss two lines of
authority.
In The South African Territories Limited v. Wallington, Lord Macnaghten
presented the traditional view that specific performance of a contract to lend
money cannot be enforced is so well established, and obviously so wholesome a
rule, that it would be idle to say a word about it."8 Professor Laycock refers59
to the recent refusal of the district court, in City Centre One Associates v.
Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association,' to enforce, at the suit of the
lender, a moneylending contract where the expected return from the lender over
thirty-five years included a share of the profits in an office block in Salt Lake
City to be constructed with the money in question. Plainly, such long-term
profits would be difficult to measure. Nor was the contract simply one to lend
and repay money at interest.
In a somewhat similar vein is the decision of the Privy Council, in Loan
Investment Corporation of Australasia v. Bonner." The respondent wrongly
repudiated an agreement to sell land and lend money to the appellant. The
appellant unsuccessfully contended for an order for specific performance of the
agreement, and was left to seek damages. The contract confirmed a sale and
purchase of land for £13,300 and the lending and borrowing of £11,000 without
security for ten years at 7.5% interest.62 The majority of their Lordships held
that where a composite contract includes what was a long-term, unsecured loan,
the loan ought not to be treated as something different simply by being
connected with a sale of land.3 The dissenting member of the Board was the
Chief Justice of Australia, Sir Garfield Barwick. He said:
No doubt the general assumption is that damages for a breach of a mere
promise to lend money adequately compensates the would be borrower. But,
in my opinion, that assumption of fact is not necessarily of universal validity and,
again in my opinion, must yield in any case when in fact in the particular
circumstances damages would not do justice between the parties. So it seems to
me that equity in the more complicated conditions of the modern world may
well yet find an occasion when justice can only be done in relation to a contract
merely to lend money by ordering its specific performance. But whatever the
position as to a promise which is no more than a promise to lend money, I can

see no reason in principle why the presence of a term in a contract that money

58.

[1898] A.C. 309, 318.
LAYcOCK, supra note 18, at 102.
60. 656 F. Supp. 658 (D. Utah 1987).
59.
61.
62.
63.

[1970] N.Z.L.R. 724.
Id. at 734.
Id. at 735.
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shall be advanced itself calls for a denial of the remedy of specific performance.
Still less can I see any departure from principle in ordering specific performance
of a contract to sell or purchase land where one term of the purchase is that
money shall be left in the hands of one of the parties to be payable to the other
on the basis of money lent rather than as a balance of purchase money. There
is, as I have said, no difficulty whatever in ordering specific performance of an
obligation to pay money ....
If the agreement is performed the appellant will have the land which in general

is an appreciating asset certainly in places such as New Zealand (as to which
possibility there was positive evidence in the case) against a very small outlay of
cash, [and] have a lengthy time in which to pay what was, in my opinion, in
substance the balance of the purchase price.... But the dominant reason for
holding that damages cannot be a sufficient remedy is that the subject-matter of
the agreement was in whole or in part the transfer of land.'

The current position in Australia is best illustrated by Wight v. HaberdanPty
Ltd.65 After noting that the general rule was not founded upon any philosophical objection to an order entailing the mere payment of money, Justice Kearney
said that the question to be determined was whether damages would be adequate
to answer the demands of justice. In the present case, as in Vandeventer v. Dale
Construction Co.,6 to which his Honour referred, the complications involved in
the plaintiff being left to pursue a claim for damages were so monumental, and
the prospects of an adequate recovery so remote, as to render such a course an
unjust imposition on the plaintiff. The plaintiff obtained specific performance
of a contract with a moneylender to provide accommodation to enable
completion of a contract to purchase land for development. The plaintiff had
been induced by the moneylender to enter into the project, had mortgaged other
assets to it, and would, as a practical matter, be unable to refinance elsewhere
to complete the purchase, as time was of the essence.
Cases dealing with trespass to land also require special mention. It is wellsettled that an action lies at law for trespass to land and nominal damages are
recoverable without proof of actual damage. As I have indicated, an injunction
may issue to restrain repeated trespasses, so as to avoid a multiplicity of actions
at law for nominal damages. But such cases apart, the traditional view has been
that a court may refuse to issue an injunction where the plaintiff suffers no
appreciable damage, and the plaintiff is left to the dry action at law. However,
in Woollerton and Wilson Ltd v. Richard Costain Ltd.,67 Justice Stamp said that
"the very fact that no harm is done is a reason for rather than against the
granting of an injunction" in a trespass case. That is a non sequitur. Further,
in John Trenberth Ltd v. National Westminster Bank Ltd.,' Justice Walton
supported the grant of an injunction to restrain a trespass on the odd ground that

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 742, 744.
[1984] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 280.
534 P.2d 183 (Or. 1975).
[1970] 1 AU E.R. 483, 485.
(1979) 39 P. & C.R. 104, 108.
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such an order was "very close" to an order enforcing a contractual negative
stipulation. These authorities, curious though they are, were accepted by the
Court of Appeal in Patel v. WH. Smith (Eziot) Ltd.69
V
A LEGAL RIGHT
It appears clear enough that a plaintiff cannot obtain an injunction in aid of
what otherwise has no identifiable existence as a constitutional or a statutory
right, or a right arising under the general law of contract and tort. Thus, both
English and Australian courts hold that a plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction
to restrain activity calculated to cause damage to the business and goodwill of
the plaintiff, where the defendant's activity, although injurious, is not tortious.7 °
Equity may restrain a party from commencing or pursuing legal proceedings
in a foreign forum. Such cases are not decided merely by asking whether the
plaintiff has an adequate remedy in damages in the local forum for the tort of
malicious prosecution arising from the foreign proceedings. It is said that the
local court has a duty to protect its jurisdiction to the extent necessary to provide
full justice to litigants and to give effect to the public policies of the forum.7 1
Again, there is an affinity with the common injunction of former times. In
Australia, this is a jurisdiction with a substantial history, one that still flourishes." But what is the legal right of the plaintiff who seeks an injunction against
the institution or continuation of proceedings in the foreign court? In an English
decision, Associated Newspapers Group plc v. Insert Media Limited, 3 Justice
Hoffman said that the plaintiff in the forum does not seek to assert any
independent cause of action but, rather, "a right not to be sued in the foreign
court." In other cases, the "right" of the plaintiff may be an immunity from
interference by unconstitutional laws or executive action, and in such a case, the
"right" flows from the terms of the Constitution itself.74
VI
LEGAL RIGHT OF A PROPRIETARY NATURE

There were many statements in nineteenth century English cases to the effect
that the foundation of equitable interference by injunction was the protection of

69. [1987] 2 All E.R. 569, 573.
70. White v. Mellin, [1895] A.C. 154; Moorgate Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Philip Morris Ltd. (No. 2),
(1984) 156 C.L.R. 414; Associated Newspapers Group v. Insert Media Ltd., [19881 2 All E.R. 420;
Williams v. Marac Australia Ltd., (1986) 5 N.S.W.L.R. 529, 532-33.
71. Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984). See EDWARD
D. RE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REMEDIES ch. 3, § 3 (2d ed., 1987).
72. Morgan v. Higginson, (1897) 13 W.N. (N.S.W.) 146, 200; National Mutual Holdings Pty. Ltd.
v. Sentry Corporation, (1989) 22 F.C.R. 209, 230-233; Re Siromath Pty. Ltd. (No. 3), (1991) 9 A.C.L.C.
1587. The same is true of Canada. See Amchem Products Inc. v. Workers' Compensation Board, (1990)
75 D.L.R. (4th) 1.
73. [1988] 2 All E.R. 420, 424-25.
74. Tableland Peanuts Pty. Ltd. v. The Peanut Marketing Board, (1984) 58 A.LJ.R. 283, 284.
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property. In Australia, those pronouncements struck what once seemed to be
a deep root. So it was that, in 1934, in refusing an application for an injunction
to restrain the expulsion of the plaintiff from a major national political party, the
High Court said, in Cameron v. Hogan, "The foundation of the jurisdiction to
grant an injunction is the existence of some civil right of a proprietary nature
proper to be protected."75 Three years later, the High Court rejected the
notion, then current in England, that a person who paid an admission fee to
enter upon premises to view a spectacle or entertainment thereby acquired an
interest sufficiently proprietary in character to merit protection by injunction
against wrongful removal from the premises.76
Yet, in the more recent Australian decisions, there is little to be seen of the
principle propounded in Cameron v. Hogan. Nor have cases been reported in
which plaintiffs with a legal right are denied injunctive relief on the footing that
the legal right is not proprietary in nature. It is instructive to trace the
development of the authorities to this condition. A similar situation appears to
have been obtained in the United States, at least since Kenyon v. City of
Chicopee" was decided in Massachusetts in 1946, wherein the court held that
equity protects personal rights by injunction upon the same condition as it
protects property rights.
The law as to the granting of injunctive relief in aid of negative covenants has
long been in a special position. Lord Cairns L.C. said, in Doherty v. Allman,78
that in enforcing a negative covenant, equity had no discretion to exercise. From
time to time, his Lordship's remarks were interpreted as significant in two
respects: first, that no question of the adequacy or inadequacy of damages arose;
and second, that the plaintiff did not have to demonstrate any proprietary right.
However, in more recent times, the Lord Chancellor's remarks have been
interpreted as meaning, perhaps, no more than that where a party comes to court
to oppose the grant of such an injunction, on the footing that hardship would be
caused by the grant of the injunction, equity says "[w]hy should it be a hardship
that you be made to keep your promise?" 79 Further, in Dalgety Wine Estates
ProprietaryLimited v. Rizzon, 8 Justice Mason said that there had been general
disagreement as to how the statement by Lord Cairns should be reformed if it
were accurately to express the true principle. His Honour continued:

75. (1934) 51 C.L.R. 358, 377 (Rich, Dixon, Evatt, McTiernan, JJ.). There were similar statements
in U.S. authorities. See Developments in the Law, supra note 45, at 998-1001.
76. Cowell v. The Rosehill Racecourse Co. Ltd., (1937) 56 C.L.R. 605. The High Court there
refused to follow the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Hurst v. Picture Theatres Ltd., (1915)
1 K.B. 1. Justice Dixon referred with approval to the decision, delivered by Justice Holmes, in Marrone
v. Washington Jockey Club, 227 U.S. 633 (1913). Marrone was recently reaffirmed as authoritative by
the Maryland Court of Appeal in Silbert v. Ramsey, 482 A.2d 147, 150-51 (1984).
77. 70 N.E.2d 241, 244 (Mass. 1946). See Donald E. Eames, The Protection of PersonalRights In
Equity Since 1946, 32 B.U.L. REv. 419 (1952).
78.

(1878) 3 App. Cas. 709,719-20, construedin WALTER ASHBURNER, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 384-

85 (Davis Browne ed., 2d ed. 1933).
79. Pullen v. Abalchek Pty. Ltd., (1990) 20 N.S.W.L.R. 732, 735.
80. (1979) 141 C.L.R. 552.
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The reason for this is that it is quite impossible to formulate an illuminating
statement of principle which is capable of universal application. There is no
limit to the number and to the kind of negative stipulations, express or implied,
which the courts may be asked to enforce. It is not surprising, therefore, that it
has emerged from a long line of judicial decisions that the attitudes of the courts
to the enforcement of negative stipulations have varied according to the nature
of the stipulation, the nature of the contract in which it is found, the effect which
enforcement will have on the relationship of the parties under the contract and
the character of the order required to enforce the stipulation.
Thus, the courts have frequently refused injunctions to restrain a breach of a
negative stipulation in a contract for the sale of chattels or goods, in a contract
for personal service and in a contract the enforcement of which would require
the contractor to supervise the performance of the contract . .. . [T]hese
instances clearly demonstrate that the courts have a general discretion to refuse
relief by way of injunction, even in cases where the court's consideration does
not extend beyond the private rights of the parties to a contract .... 81

The requirement of a proprietary interest has been used to support the denial
of injunctive relief against the commission of torts that do not injure the
proprietary rights or interests of the plaintiff. An example is trespass to the
person, although, as has been pointed out, trespass also may be a crime.'
However, paragraph 114(1)(a) of the Family Law Act of 1975 invests the Family
Court of Australia with jurisdiction to grant an injunction for the personal
protection of a party to a marriage or to a child of the marriage.'
It also has been said that an injunction does not lie to prevent publication of
a libel or slander unless the plaintiff can show that the apprehended wrong also
would amount to the commission of the tort of trade libel or malicious falsehood,
injuring the plaintiff's commercial interests.'
In defamation cases, the
Australian courts have held that the plaintiff cannot obtain injunctive relief
without establishing that a subsequent finding by a jury that the matter
complained of was not defamatory of the plaintiff would be set aside as
unreasonable, and that there is no real ground for supposing that the defendant
might succeed upon any defence of justification, privilege, or comment.8 5
But the plaintiff's lack of a proprietary right in his or her reputation was not
the only basis of denial of equitable relief Quite apart from any constitutional
guarantee, Fox's Libel Act 1792 marked the end, in Britain, of a long parliamentary struggle to ensure that cases of libel would be tried at common law, before
a jury. Why, then, should an equity judge preempt that issue? In Fleming v.
Newton,' Lord Cottenham L.C., in the course of dealing with an appeal from

81.
82.
83.

Id. at 573-74.
Corvisy v. Corvisy, [1982] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 557, 561.
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

84. Swimsure (Laboratories) Pty. Ltd. v. McDonald, [1979] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 796,799; see also Kenyon,
70 N.E.2d at 244.
85. Stocker v. McElhinney (No. 2), [1961] N.S.W.R. 1043, 1048. See also Robert A. Hayes,
Injunctions Before Judgment in Cases of Defamation, 45 A.L.J. 125, 181 (1971). There is, as I have

indicated, no constitutional impediment to "prior restraint."
86.

(1848) 9 Eng. Rep. 797, 803.
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Scotland, said:
That act [55 Geo. III cap. 42] appoints a jury as the proper tribunal for trial of
injuries to the person by libel or defamation; and the liberty of the press consists
in the unrestricted right of publishing, subject to the responsibilities attached to
the publication of libels, public or private. But if the publication is to be
anticipated and prevented by the intervention of the Court of Session, the
jurisdiction over libels is taken from the jury, and the right of unrestricted
publication is destroyed.'

Whilst asserting the existence of the jurisdiction in equity, Roscoe Pound said
that "it must be admitted that Lord Cottenham put his finger on a serious
difficulty in the way of injunctions in these cases."' He also pointed out' that
equity is not precluded from preventing irreparable injury through a civil wrong
because the act, in another aspect, may be the subject of a criminal prosecution.
Statutory law has also had an important part to play in the decline of the
significance attached to the requirement of a proprietary right. A particular
statute may both create new rights and provide, in terms, for enforcement by
injunction. Laws establishing the patent and copyright systems are obvious
examples. Further, the statute may specify that the injunctive remedy is
available, but with variations to what would otherwise be the requirements under
the general law. An example is section 80 of the Trade Practices Act 1974,9
which invests the Federal Court of Australia with the power to enjoin
contraventions both of the antitrust provisions and of certain consumer
protection provisions of that legislation. As amended in 1977, section 80
empowers the court to grant an interim or a final injunction, whether or not the
defendant has previously engaged in the conduct in question, and whether or not
there is "an imminent danger of substantial damage to any person" if the
defendant engages in the conduct. 91
Other statutes create new rights in specified classes of persons and provide
for new remedies, but do not specifically include among them the injunction. In
such cases, the general rule is that specified by Justice Farwell in Stevens v.
Chown:
In my opinion there was nothing to prevent the old Court of Chancery from
granting an injunction to restrain the infringement of a newly created statutory
right, unless the Act of Parliament creating the right provided a remedy which
if enacted should be the only remedy-subject only to this, that the right so
created was such a right as the court under its original jurisdiction take
cognizance of.

87. Id.
88. Roscoe Pound, Equitable Relief againstDefamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV. L.
REV. 640, 657 (1915-1916).
89. Id. at 643.
90. Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
91. Id. § 80.
92. [1901] 1 Ch. 894, 904.
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In many of the cases dealing with new rights created by statute, an attenuated
meaning has been given to the concept of proprietary right. Two examples will
suffice. In Howes v. Gosford Shire Council,93 Justice Jacobs granted an
injunction against the servants and agents of the defendant local government
authority, and against four of its councillors, which restrained them from acting
on a resolution purporting to dismiss the plaintiff. The ground for intervention
was that the resolution was void for want of a quorum at the meeting. The
plaintiff held office as the Shire Clerk under a contract of service and under the
provisions of a state statute regulating local government. Justice Jacobs said that
the interest of the plaintiff was not that arising from the mere relation of master
and servant (in which case equity had no jurisdiction to interfere), but from the
interest of the plaintiff arising from his statutory office.94 The latter was all that
was required to establish his right to protection by injunction.
The legislation with which the Supreme Court was concerned in Potter v.
Ferguson95 imposed a duty on a landlord to give to a tenant a right in the
nature of a right of preemption or first refusal, that is to say, an obligation
requiring the landlord to refrain from selling without giving to the tenant the
opportunity of purchasing in preference to any other buyer. Justice Powell held
that, although the statute thereby created no equitable interest96 in the subject
land, the tenant had a personal right enforceable by injunction.
In other cases, the injunction is granted in aid of the new statutory right
without any enquiry as to whether or not the right is proprietary in nature. An
example is provided by Bradley v. The Commonwealth.' There, the High
Court granted an injunction to restrain interference by the federal government
with the plaintiff's right to use postal and telephonic services conferred by the
Post and Telegraph Act of 1901. The plaintiff had been using these services to
conduct the "Rhodesia Information Centre"; the federal government was
antipathetic to the giving of support to the regime then in power in what is now
Zimbabwe.
Difficulties have arisen also in cases where the court has been dealing not
with legislation creating rights in the plaintiff, but with prohibitions imposed by
statutes of general application, so that the complaint is of the violation by the
defendant of a public right. A number of cases have been concerned with
repeated infractions of municipal laws imposing a restriction or prohibition upon
the use of land. In Attorney-General v. Gill,98 decided in 1926, a distinction was

drawn between statutory prohibitions creating public rights of a proprietary
nature (for example, statutes forbidding the obstruction of highways) and

93.
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95.
96.
97.
98.

[1962] N.S.W.R. 58.
Id. at 65.
[1979] 1 N.S.W.L.R. 364.
Id. at 373.
(1973) 128 C.L.R. 557.
[1927] V.L.R. 22.
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statutory prohibitions not doing so (for example, statutory prohibitions restricting
the use of land in residential districts). Only the former attracted the equitable
jurisdiction to interfere by injunction.
However, in later decisions, courts recognised that the notion of publicly held
proprietary rights was confused and impractical. Many injunctions were granted
to protect benefits or advantages that could not be regarded as having any
resemblance at all to proprietary rights. Finally, in 1963, the High Court granted
injunctive relief in aid of a restraint upon the engagement in trade or business
in a residential area, and said that the wide discretion of the court was an
adequate safeguard against abuse of the salutary procedure available by
injunction."
The appropriate plaintiff, where the court is enforcing by injunctions
prohibitions imposed by statutes of general application, is the Attorney-General,
acting with or without a relator. A further complication arises where the
Attorney-General of the day declines to seek an injunction to enforce such a
statutory prohibition or to lend his name to such proceedings, but private citizens
assert the necessary standing to act in his place. In many such cases, the statute
in question has been concerned with prevention of public nuisances, and the
plaintiff has asserted a peculiar injury from the nuisance to the plaintiffs
proprietary rights. In those cases, the plaintiff clearly has had standing. The
difficulty that has arisen has occurred where the plaintiff's interest in the matter
derives otherwise than from an apprehended injury to proprietary rights.
The Australian authorities indicate that an equity court will lend its aid to the
enforcement of a statute at the suit of a person who has a "special interest" in
its enforcement, being an "interest" over and above that held by the ordinary
members of the public, and being more than a "mere intellectual or emotional
concern" in the subject matter.1°° It is clear from the authorities that the
"interest" need not be a proprietary interest, let alone a legal interest. Thus, in
Onus v. Alcoa of Australia Limited,101 persons who claimed to be descendants

and members of a particular Aboriginal tribe, and to be custodians of relics of
cultural and spiritual importance to those people, were held to have standing to
commence an action to restrain a corporation from contravention of the
prohibition in section 21 of the Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act of 1972.1°
In the result, there is now much to be said for the proposition that, in
Australia, an injunction lies to protect legal rights, only if those rights may be
described as proprietary in character. In describing rights as proprietary in
character, the courts have been apt to use circular reasoning. Speaking of

99. Cooney v. The Council of Ku-ring-gai, (1963) 114 C.L.R. 582, where the earlier authorities are
collected and discussed.
100. Australian Conservation Foundation Incorporated v. The Commonwealth, (1980) 146 C.L.R.
493.
101. (1981) 149 C.L.R. 27.
102. (Vict.).
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common law trademarks, Justice Windeyer said the following:
There is, no doubt, some circuity in saying that the protection which the Court
of Chancery gave by injunctions to plaintiffs who had acquired trade marks by
use and reputation made such trade marks a form of property-and then saying
that the intervention of the Court in such cases was based upon the protection
of an equitable proprietary interest. 1 3

It is true also in this field that, as with the inadequacy of damages, in many
cases other reasons might have been found for the denial of injunctive relief.
With the erosion of dogmatically stated principles, it is now appropriate to deal,
in terms, with those other reasons when they are seen to be of decisive

importance.
VII
CONCLUSION

The Australian experience confirms what was said, under the heading "The

Triumph of Equity" by Professor Chayes in his article The Role of the Judge In
Public Law Litigation:
One of the most striking procedural developments of this century is the
increasing importance of equitable relief. It is perhaps too soon to reverse the
traditional maxim to read that money damages will be awarded only when no
suitable form of specific relief can be devised. But surely, the old sense of
equitable remedies as "extraordinary" has faded.m

103. Colbeam Palmer Ltd. v. Stock Affiliates Pty. Ltd., (1968) 122 C.L.R. 25, 34. See also Felix S.
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COL. L. REv. 809, 814-17 (1935).
104. Chayes, supra note 8, at 1292.

